A Belgian journalist who interviewed me recently about the European debt crisis asked me whether I believed in the European Project. I replied that I would answer her question—if she would tell me what the European Project actually was. By revealing my doubts, I proved to her that I suffered from the strange kind of mental debility known as Euroskepticism, a condition supposedly compounded of low intelligence and aggressive xenophobia. The low intelligence manifests itself in the patient’s view of European institutions as a gravy train for a transnational nomenklatura, rather than as the beginning of a new, generous, and free-spirited type of postnational identity. The xenophobia manifests itself as a secret desire for conflict and war, the European Union and its predecessors supposedly having been responsible for the avoidance of war on the Continent over the last 65 years.
Det er godt set fordi, personer som denne journalist, og de som deler hendes synspunkt, kan simpelthen ikke se, at deres syn på verden er mere firkantet, mere sort og hvidt, end verdensanskuelsen hos mange af de EU-modstandere og skeptikere, som de gerne tænker det værste om.
Hvis man ikke ligefrem har et hemmeligt ønske om krig og konflikt, så er man som EU-skeptiker i det mindste ligeglad med, at det kan være konsekvensen af at ende EU-samarbejdet. Sådan er der desværre mennesker, der tænker.
The journalist then asked whether I thought that nationalism was dangerous. The question implied that the choice before Europe was between the European Union and fascism: that all that stood between us and the ascension to power of new Mussolinis, Francos, and Hitlers were the free lunches of senior Eurocrats. I replied that dangerous forms of nationalism existed, of course, but that in the present circumstances, supranationalism represented by far the greater danger. Not only was such supranationalism undemocratic, for it reflected no widespread demand or sentiment among the population; it also risked provoking the very kind of nationalism against which it was to stand as the bulwark. Further, the breakup of supranational polities in Europe tends to be messy, as history demonstrates.
Alternativet til EU er ikke nationalisme. Alternativet er de stater, man så efter anden verdenskrig og før EU kom på banen. Stater med selvbestemmelse og nærdemokrati. Stater, hvor alene de folkevalgte bestemmer. Stater, hvor man i mange tilfælde kunne råbe de folkevalgte op. Hvor politisk apati var langt mindre end i dag. Nationalisme var i disse stater et lille problem, og den form for nationalisme, vi ønsker så lidt af som muligt, den vil jeg give Dalrymple ret i, at det er meget muligt, at netop EU vil styrke nærmere end ende. Men den mulighed overvejes slet ikke, selv om da det brød løs i Eks-Jugoslavien var der mange, der tænkte at det samme kunne ske andre steder i Europa.
Dalrymple fortsætter med causerier over Belgien, der netop er et land, hvor store modsætninger lurer under overfladen:
Belgium has not had a central government for more than 500 days. While I must admit, as an occasional visitor to that country, that the difference between Belgium with and Belgium without a central government is not apparent on casual inspection, this interregnum may take the theory of limited government too far. (...)
Historical and economic factors deepen the division between the two regions. Wallonia, though it contained a minority of Belgium’s population, long dominated its culture and economy. Even the Flemish upper class spoke French at home, while Dutch was the language of the peasantry; until recently, Belgian schools forbade children from speaking Dutch in class. With the decline of Wallonia’s coal and steel industries and the economic rise of Flanders, however, the pattern of dominance changed. Flanders went from being the poor relation to being the rich one, albeit with something of an inferiority complex. In the process, it started to make large transfer payments to Wallonia, which suffered from comparatively high unemployment. (...)
It is no surprise, therefore, that the largest political parties in Flanders are either nationalist or free-market; both philosophies lead to reducing or stopping the transfer payments. It is equally unsurprising that the largest political party in Wallonia is socialist and wants the payments to continue or increase. The Wallonian socialist party’s patronage powers in its territory are almost feudal in nature and extent; the last thing that the party of social change wants is actual change. But neither the Flemish parties nor the Wallonian socialists are strong enough to impose a government on the whole country. (...)Den manglende regering ville, som Dalrymple fortsætter ikke være et problem, hvis det ikke lige det var fordi, at Belgiens økonomiske situation er en af de værste i EU med gæld på omkring 100 procent af BNP og et årligt underskud på over 5 pct. af BNP. Og de to parter kan ikke finde en fællesløsning:
The Walloons want higher taxes to maintain the current arrangements; the Flemish want lower taxes and reduced spending to promote long-term growth. The result is a stalemate. Wallonia and Flanders are like a married couple who no longer can live together but find divorce impossible because of difficulties over the settlement.
Så påpeger han det ironiske i, at EU administrationen er placeret i Bruxelles i Belgien:
It happens that the central offices of the E.U. are located in Brussels. Yet the political difficulties of Belgium do not give the European unionists pause for thought—or, if they do pause, they reach a peculiar conclusion: that what has not worked in two centuries in a small area with only two populations will work in a few years in a much larger area with a multitude of populations. It does not occur to the unionists that different countries really are different: not a little bit, but radically, in culture, language, history, traditions, and economies.Han skifter nu til eksemplet med Irland og Grækenland, to ekstremer i Europa. Irerne roser han, fordi han er af den opfattelse, at de er det eneste folk i Europa, der i udpræget grad har forstået deres egen medskyld i den økonomiske krise. Selv om de også har skudt mod bankerne og politikerne:
Most people seemed to understand that the seven fat—indeed, grossly obese—years simply had to be followed by the seven lean. The relation of the previous excess to the present hardship was obvious to everyone, and the population sought no scapegoats, even if, correctly, it blamed the politicians and bankers more than it blamed itself.Irerne har til gengæld holdt fast i deres lave selskabsskat, og en absurd kritik er blevet rettet mod landet af den grund - lige så absurd, som den der blev rettet mod Tyskland for et par år siden.
Men Dalrymple er naturligvis selv den bedste til at udstille absurditeten i EUs holdning til Irland lave selskabsskat:
Since the crash, successive Irish governments have had the determination to fight to retain their low corporate tax, called “predatory” by the other Europeans. (It is symptomatic of Europe’s sickness that refraining from government seizure of money is now deemed by its political class to be predation.) The Irish economy may thus be poised for a quicker recovery.Men den samme fordel, som Tyskland har af en fællesmønt kombineret med en utrolig stærk konkurrenceevne, kan være den bagdel, der vælter hele EU-læsset, som Dalrymple skriver:
For a time, the euro did seem to serve German interests, allowing countries to buy German goods that they might not otherwise have been able to buy. Meanwhile, Germany, with a determination not shown by other European countries, reduced payroll taxes and barely increased wages, having previously established a powerful manufacturing base. Savings rose, and Germany became the China of Europe. Now it has the problem of what to do with its trade surplus, larger than the trade deficits of France, Italy, and Spain combined.Den tyske model med tæring før næring og opbygningen af en stærk økonomi, stram styring og stærke krav til at skære i velfærden bliver heller ikke velmodtaget i de lande, der har problemer med gæld.
Europeans have painted themselves into a corner. If the debts of European countries are mutualized, there can be only one country that lays down the rules of mutualization, and it won’t be France, struggling with a large deficit, large debts, and a large trade imbalance. The historian John Robert Seeley famously wrote that the British Empire had been formed “in a fit of absence of mind”; so could it be with German hegemony in Europe.
Sat på spidsen, så skal resten af EU acceptere en ideologisk kolonisering af tysk økonomisk og politisk mentalitet, blive kolonier i et tysk imperie, eller hele EU-projektet falder fra hinanden, fordi resten af landene ikke formår at være konkurrencedygtige under en stærk euro, eller styre deres offentlige forbrug.
Her skal man også skelne imellem, at der er forskel på den tyske politiske elite, og den tyske befolkning, hvor modstanden mod EU og det at betale for andre landes manglende evne til at konkurrere og styre deres offentlige udgifter slår hårdt i gennem. I det tyske folkedyb forstår man næppe helt fordelen i, at de øvrige EU-lande tvinges til en kunstig høj valuta og, hvad det betyder for den tyske konkurrenceevne.
Det er med andre ord en nærmest umulig situation, som Dalrymple også berører:
The alternative to sharing the debts seems to be the breakup of the euro. This might turn recession into prolonged slump, with the countries expelled from the eurozone forced into a default catastrophic for the banking system. I get dizzy just thinking about the bank account in which I hold euros: in the event of a breakup, will it be denominated in drachmas or deutschmarks, and who will decide? Like everyone else, I would prefer deutschmarks, a preference that will drive up the price of the currency to the point that German exports, no matter how high their quality, will be too expensive to buy.Han slutter sit essay af med at konstantere, at de frygtelige tanker, som EU skulle afskaffe, har EU nu i stedet genoplivet. Og jeg er fuldstændig enig i den analyse, men håber det ender noget bedre, end man kan frygte:
No wonder German chancellor Angela Merkel appears indecisive: like every politician, she wants a painless solution to a problem. She does not want to throw Germany’s weight about, demanding every country’s Papieren, bitte. Yet she does not want to be responsible for rampant inflation or for the breakup of the euro, either. Whatever she decides, love of Germany in Europe will not grow.
In short, the incontinent spending of many European governments, which awarded whole populations unearned benefits at the expense of generations to come, has—along with a megalomaniacal currency union—produced a crisis not merely economic but social, political, and even civilizational. The European Union that was supposed to put an end to war on the continent has resuscitated antagonisms that might end in bellicosity, if not in outright war. And the European Project stands revealed as what any sensible person could have seen it always was: something akin to the construction of a massive, post-Tito Yugoslavia.
Læs hele Dalrymples artikel her på City Journal:
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