Her er hans "spådomme" omkring 2013 (senest 2014) i konfliktbæltet:
"If 2011 was the year of the Arab Spring, 2013 looks to be the year of the Arab Fall. The hopes of quick, easy democracy have already been eclipsed by the rise of radical Islamist groups, which are no less extreme for coming to power through elections."...
"Three events that might not make it into 2013—they could take until 2014–but whose signs will be increasingly visible, are:
–The end of the Syrian civil war with the overthrow of the Bashar al-Asad regime and the coming to power of a rebel coalition dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists.
–An economic crisis in Egypt that will drive the Brotherhood regime—and simultaneously give it an excuse—toward greater extremism, a crackdown on dissidents, and a growing hysteria against the United States and Israel.
–Iran obtaining nuclear weapons or being attacked by Israel.
In Libya, though, things may move more quickly. There, in contrast to Egypt and Tunisia, there is no Islamist regime to appease the Salafists or keep them under control. The killing of four Americans in Benghazi seems like a prelude to a new Libyan civil war. Radical Islamists, with support from some of the armed militias that did or did not join the country’s army, try to overthrow what they see as a Western puppet regime despite its winning an election."
Han kommer ikke ind på Libanon i denne omgang, der igen har truslerne om en borgerkrig hængende over hovedet med Syriens kollaps.
Barry Rubin vurderer i en anden artikel, at intet står i vejen i forhold til en islamisering af Egypten - heller ikke hæren: En udrensning er i gang, hvor broderskabets folk stille og roligt listes i nøglepositioner i både hæren, ved domstolene, samt på det i store dele af den muslimske verden toneangivende islamiske universitet, Al-Azhar .
Det Islamiske Broderskab har masser af tålmodighed, ved de skal være forsigtige, men målet er stadigvæk en fundamentalistisk shariastat og midlet en islamisk revolution:
De første spæde skridt af denne revolution kan allerede ses i forhandlingerne og det nuværende udkast til Egyptens nye forfatning:
The media, or at least a large part of it, is tamed. The draft constitution written by the Brotherhood and Salafists allows the government to shut down any newspaper or television station by decree. The courts are made impotent and judges replaced. Mursi’s decree said he could ignore any court decision.
At a November 18 press conference, a few days before Mursi issued his decree, the leading secular-oriented representatives in the constitution-writing constituent assembly resigned, charging the new document would enshrine Sharia law. The problem was not the statement in Article 2 about Sharia being the main source of Egyptian legislation but rather later provisions making it clear that Islamist-controlled institutions would interpret precisely what that meanHan understreger, at denne revolution, som i Iran, vil gøre skelnen mellem moderate og fundamentalistiske muslimer irrelevant:
Many clerics are not moderate but most are not systematic Islamists. Soon they will be or at least talk as if they were. Revolutionary Islamism will become in Egypt merely normative Islam. Thus is the endless debate in the West about the nature of Islam — religion of peace or religion of terrorism? — short-circuited and made even more irrelevant. The real power is not what the texts say but who interprets them. And the Islamists will do the interpreting. Amr Moussa, former foreign minister and Arab League secretary-general, said the new constitution would bring disaster for Egypt. Abdel Meguid called this combination “Taliban-like.”Her følger nogle hovedpointer opsummeret: Moderate/verdslige og andre dissidenter er for fragmenterede og uden pondus økonomisk og ikke-voldelige. De har ikke en chance. Salafisterne er utålmodige og klar til at slå ned på alt ikke-islamisk med brutal magt og vil ifølge Rubins vurdering få lov til at angribe kvinder uden slør, kristne uden indgreb.
Hæren er det eneste, der kan standse islamiseringen, men hæren har udviklet sig til et stort økonomisk foretagende med egne landbrug, fabrikker og ejendomsinvesteringer. Ifølge Rubin er hæren primært interesseret i at beskytte dets økonomiske interesser og viste omvendt under det såkaldte arabiske forår, at den ikke var interesseret i at skyde på det egyptiske folk. Hæren foretrækker at bevare dens popularitet og økonomiske magt, så rører islamisterne ikke ved hærens økonomiske status vil den næppe gøre, som hæren gjorde i Algeriet for omkring 20 år siden, nemlig stoppede en islamisk regering.
Det muslimske broderskabs prioritet i nærmeste fremtid er heller ikke at rasle med sablen i forhold til Israel, selv om de ikke ligefrem vil bede Hamas om at holde sig på måtten:
For the time being, however, as indicated by the ceasefire, Egypt’s new regime doesn’t want a conflict either. Consolidating its power within the country and creating a new order that will last for decades is a big task. All the institutions must be transformed, a constitution finalized and adopted, billions of dollars of foreign aid begged, oppositions tamed. As an indication, the radical nationalist regime in the 1950s spent three years at that task before turning toward an attempt to dominate the region.
Patience and practical sense of how to proceed to accomplish radical objectives should not be mistaken for moderation. The Middle East will still be there to Islamize, Israel will be there to destroy, and American influence will be there to eliminate when Mursi is ready.
Følg Barry Rubins dækning af mellemøsten på Pajamas Media, en dækning du ikke finder i samme realistiske kvalitet andre steder, da området stort aldrig ses som "tingen i sig selv", men som "tingen for os" vesterlændinge, altså farvet af de lyserøde briller, der antager at bag ethvert ønske om at fjerne diktatorer gemmer sig drømmen om demokrati.
Eller som han udtrykker det selv:
As an Israeli, I often find it’s much easier to talk with Turks, Iranians and Arabs because we are on the same page – especially in private – about understanding the reality of the region compared to the fantasies often held in Western academic, media and governmental circles.
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